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Abstract
We propose a formal model of rational exchange and exchange protocols in general, which is
based on game theory. In this model, an exchange protocol is represented as a set of strategies in
a game that is played by the protocol parties and the network that they use to communicate with
each other. Within this model, we give a formal definition for rational exchange and various other
properties of exchange protocols, including fairness. In particular, rational exchange is defined
in terms of a Nash equilibrium in the protocol game. We also study the relationship between
rational and fair exchange, and prove that fairness implies rationality, but not vice versa. Finally,
we illustrate the usage of our formal model for the analysis of existing rational exchange protocols
by analyzing a protocol proposed by Syverson. We show that the protocol is rational only under
the assumption that the network is reliable.
1 Introduction
Recently, new computing and networking paradigms have emerged, which are based on the concept
of self-organization. The most prominent examples are peer-to-peer computing and wireless ad hoc
networks. Due to their very nature, the operation of these systems is based on mechanisms that are
fundamentally different from those used in traditional computing and networking systems. Of course,
this applies not only to the basic mechanisms but to the security mechanisms as well [26, 31, 2, 16,
13, 7, 28, 29].
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In this context, rational exchange becomes particularly interesting. The concept of rational ex-
change has been introduced by Syverson in [27], where he describes an exchange protocol that is
similar to fair exchange, but in fact, it does not provide true fairness. Syverson calls the protocol
rational exchange, because it ensures that rational, self-interested parties have no reason to misbehave
and deviate from it.
Although Syverson’s protocol does not achieve fairness, it has a very appealing feature: it does
not use a trusted third party. We started to study rational exchange exactly for this reason. In the
context of the Terminodes Project1 [14], we are concerned with the design of self-organizing wireless
ad hoc networks. These are networks of mobile nodes where communication is based on multi-hop
relaying. In extreme cases, such networks do not rely on a fixed infrastructure at all (e.g., military
and rescue operations). In less extreme cases, ad hoc networks are considered as extensions to an
already established fixed infrastructure (e.g., multi-hop cellular networks [18, 30]). In both cases,
the use of exchange protocols that rely on a trusted third party to achieve fairness is problematic.
The reason is that, in the infrastructureless case, the existence of a trusted third party simply cannot
be assumed, while in the other case, even if a trusted third party is present, there is no guarantee
that the nodes can access it in a timely manner due to frequent and unpredictable disconnections
from the fixed infrastructure. Although fair exchange protocols that do not rely on a trusted third
party do exist (e.g., gradual secret release schemes [11] and probabilistic protocols [20]), they are
highly inefficient in the sense that they require a high number of messages to be exchanged in order
to achieve an acceptable level of fairness. As a consequence, they are not suitable for applications
in wireless ad hoc networks, where the number of transmissions should be minimized due to the
limited available bandwidth and in order to reduce the energy consumption (i.e., save battery power
and reduce interference) of the nodes. Rational exchange, on the other hand, seems to be a promising
alternative to solve the problem, because rational exchange protocols may not use a trusted third party,
they require only a few messages to exchange, and they still provide some guarantees with respect to
fairness (their relation to the property of fairness will be clarified later in this paper).
In this paper, we give a formal definition for rational exchange. The value of a formal definition
is threefold:
• First, attempting to give a formal definition itself helps to better understand the concept, which
is a prerequisite for any design.
• Second, it requires the construction of a mathematical model, in which other, similar concepts,
such as fair exchange, can also be defined and compared to rational exchange. Such a compar-
ison may also help the better understanding of rational exchange. Here we note that protocols
with a flavor similar to that of the Syverson protocol have already been proposed earlier (e.g.,
[15]), but they were inappropriately called fair exchange. A precise study on the relationship of
the two concepts helps to clarify this confusion.
• Third, a formal definition is indispensable to the rigorous verification of rational exchange pro-
tocols.
The mathematical model, in which we will develop our formal definition is based on game theory
[21]. Game theory is a set of analytical tools developed to study situations in which self-interested
parties (which want to maximize their own benefits) interact with each other according to certain rules.
Since exactly this kind of situations occur in exchange protocols, game theory appears to be a natural
choice.
1http://www.terminodes.org/
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Thus, we model the situation in which parties of a given exchange protocol find themselves as a
game. We call this game the protocol game. The protocol game encodes all the possible interactions
of the protocol parties. The protocol parties are modeled as players. The protocol itself (as a set of
rules) is represented as a set of strategies (one strategy for each protocol party). Misbehavior means
that a protocol party follows a strategy that is different from its prescribed strategy.
We define the concept of rational exchange in terms of properties of the protocol game and the
prescribed strategies of the protocol parties. More precisely, we have been inspired by the striking
similarity between rational exchange as defined informally by Syverson and the concept of Nash
equilibrium in games. Therefore, we define rational exchange formally in terms of a Nash equilibrium
in the protocol game.
Our model is sufficiently rich to permit the definition of other properties of exchange protocols as
well. More specifically, we can also define fairness. Representing the concepts of rational exchange
and fair exchange in the same model allows us to study their relationships. In particular, we prove that
fairness implies rationality (assuming that the protocol satisfies certain additional requirements), but
the reverse is not true in general. Thus, the result that we obtain from the model justifies the intuition
that fairness is a stronger requirement than rationality.
Finally, defining a formal model for exchange protocols and giving a formal definition for ratio-
nal exchange in this model allows us to rigorously verify existing rational exchange protocols. In
order to illustrate this, we formally prove that the Syverson protocol satisfies our definition of ratio-
nal exchange under the assumption that the communication between the protocol parties is reliable.
However, if we relax this assumption, then rationality is lost.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who formalized the concept of rational exchange in
its full generality, studied its relation to fair exchange, and provided rigorous proofs of rationality for
existing rational exchange protocols. Although game theory has already been applied in the context of
exchange protocols (see e.g., [23, 17]), we are not aware of any formal model with the same precision
and generality as our protocol game model. Preliminary results of our work appeared earlier in [6, 9].
The outline of the paper is the following: In Section 2, we briefly introduce some basic notions
from game theory that we will use in the development of our model. We present a general framework
for the modeling of exchange protocols as games in Section 3. Based on this, in Section 4, we for-
mally define rational exchange and various other properties of exchange protocols including fairness.
We study the relationship between rational exchange and fair exchange in the same section. In Sec-
tion 5, we illustrate the usage of our model for the analysis of existing rational exchange protocols by
analyzing the Syverson protocol. Finally, we report on some related work in Section 6, and conclude
the paper in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce some notions from game theory that we will use in the paper.
2.1 Extensive games
An extensive game is a tuple
〈P,A,Q, p, (Ii)i∈P , (¹i)i∈P 〉
where
• P is a set of players;
3
• A is a set of actions;
• Q is a set of action sequences that satisfies the following properties:
– the empty sequence ² is a member of Q,
– if (ak)wk=1 ∈ Q and 0 < v < w, then (ak)vk=1 ∈ Q,
– if an infinite action sequence (ak)∞k=1 satisfies (ak)vk=1 ∈ Q for every positive integer v,
then (ak)∞k=1 ∈ Q;
If q is a finite action sequence and a is an action, then q.a denotes the finite action sequence
that consists of q followed by a. An action sequence q ∈ Q is terminal if it is infinite or if there
is no a such that q.a ∈ Q. The set of terminal action sequences is denoted by Z. For every
non-terminal action sequence q ∈ Q \ Z, A(q) denotes the set {a ∈ A : q.a ∈ Q} of available
actions after q.
• p is a player function that assigns a player in P to every non-terminal action sequence q ∈ Q\Z
(the interpretation is that player p(q) has to move after action sequence q);
• Ii is an information partition of player i ∈ P , which is a partition of the set {q ∈ Q \ Z :
p(q) = i} with the property that A(q) = A(q′) whenever q and q′ are in the same information
set Ii ∈ Ii;
• ¹i is a preference relation of player i ∈ P on Z.
The interpretation of an extensive game is the following: Each action sequence in Q represents a
possible history of the game. The action sequences that belong to the same information set Ii ∈ Ii
are indistinguishable to player i. This means that i knows that the history of the game is an action
sequence in Ii but she does not know which one. The empty sequence ² represents the starting point
of the game. After any non-terminal action sequence q ∈ Q \ Z, player p(q) chooses an action a
from the set A(q). Then q is extended with a, and the history of the game becomes q.a. The action
sequences in Z represent the possible outcomes of the game. If q, q′ ∈ Z and q ¹i q′, then player i
prefers the outcome q′ to the outcome q.
The preference relations of the players are often represented in terms of payoffs: a vector y(q) =
(yi(q))i∈P of real numbers is assigned to every terminal action sequence q ∈ Z in such a way that for
any q, q′ ∈ Z and i ∈ P , q ¹i q′ iff yi(q) ≤ yi(q′).
A finite extensive game can conveniently be represented as a tree, where the edges and the vertices
of the tree correspond to actions and action sequences, respectively. A distinguished vertex, called the
root, represents the empty sequence ². Every other vertex u represents the sequence of the actions
that belong to the edges of the path between the root and u. Let us call a vertex u terminal if the path
between the root and u cannot be extended beyond u. Terminal vertices represent the terminal action
sequences in the game. Each non-terminal vertex u is labeled by p(q) where q ∈ Q \ Z is the action
sequence that belongs to u. Finally, the terminal vertices and may be labeled with payoff vectors to
represent the preference relations of the players.
Conceptually, an infinite game (i.e., a game that has infinite action sequences) can also be thought
of as a tree. In this case, the infinite action sequences of the game are represented by infinite paths
starting from the root.
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2.2 Strategy
A strategy of player i is defined as a function si that assigns an action in A(q) to each non-terminal
action sequence q that is in the domain of si, with the restriction that it assigns the same action to q
and q′ whenever q and q′ are in the same information set of i. The domain dom(si) of si contains
only those non-terminal action sequences q for which p(q) = i and q is consistent with the moves
prescribed by si. Formally, we can define dom(si) in an inductive way as follows: A non-terminal
action sequence q = (ak)wk=1 is in dom(si) iff p(q) = i and
• either there is no 0 ≤ v < w such that p((ak)vk=1) = i;
• or for all 0 ≤ v < w such that p((ak)vk=1) = i, (ak)vk=1 is in dom(si) and si((ak)vk=1) = av+1.
We denote the set of all strategies of player i by Si.
A strategy profile is a vector (si)i∈P of strategies, where each si is a member of Si. Sometimes, we
will write (sj , (si)i∈P\{j}) instead of (si)i∈P in order to emphasize that the strategy profile specifies
strategy sj for player j.
2.3 Nash equilibrium
Let o((si)i∈P ) denote the resulting outcome when the players follow the strategies in the strategy
profile (si)i∈P . In other words, o((si)i∈P ) is the (possibly infinite) action sequence (ak)wk=1 ∈ Z
such that for every 0 ≤ v < w we have that sp((ak)vk=1)((ak)vk=1) = av+1. A strategy profile (s∗i )i∈P
is a Nash equilibrium iff for every player j ∈ P and every strategy sj ∈ Sj we have that
o(sj , (s∗i )i∈P\{j}) ¹j o(s∗j , (s∗i )i∈P\{j})
This means that if every player i other than j follows s∗i , then player j is not motivated to deviate
from s∗j , because she does not gain anything by doing so. It is possible that a game has multiple Nash
equilibria.
3 Protocol games
Game theory in general, and the above introduced notions in particular, will serve as the basis of our
model of rational exchange. We describe this model in two steps: First, in this section, we introduce
a general framework for the construction of games from exchange protocols. We refer to these games
as protocol games. The protocol game of an exchange protocol is intended to model all the possible
interactions of the (potentially misbehaving) protocol parties. The correct behavior of each party is
represented by a particular strategy within the protocol game. Second, in the next section, we define
rational exchange formally as a particular property that the strategies representing the correct behavior
of the protocol parties should satisfy.
We should note that we consider only two-party exchange protocols (i.e., protocols that involve
only two main parties and possibly a trusted third party) for two reasons. First, we want to make the
presentation easier. Second, most of the exchange protocols proposed in the literature are two-party
exchange protocols. However, our model could be extended to multi-party exchange protocols as
well.
5
3.1 System model
We assume that the network that is used by the protocol participants to communicate with each other
is reliable, which means that it delivers messages to their intended destinations within a constant time
interval. Such a network allows the protocol participants to interact in a synchronous fashion. We will
model this by assuming that the protocol participants interact with each other in rounds, where each
round consists of the following two phases:
1. each participant generates some messages based on her current state, and sends them to some
other participants;
2. each participant receives the messages that were sent to her in the current round, and performs
a state transition based on her current state and the received messages.
We adopted this approach from [19], where the same model is used to study the properties of dis-
tributed algorithms in a synchronous network system.
As we mentioned in the Section 1, our work was motivated by the use of rational exchange in
wireless ad hoc networks. Clearly, the synchronous model defined above is far from being realistic
for such networks in general. Nevertheless, it makes sense to start the investigation with a simpler
model as this may pave the way to the more general asynchronous case. One step in this direction
is presented in [4], where we sketch how the synchrony assumption could be relaxed and how asyn-
chronous systems could be modeled as games.
In addition, there are applications where the synchronous model defined above is not so unreal-
istic. Consider for instance two neighboring nodes of an ad hoc network that want to perform some
transaction with each other (e.g., execute an exchange protocol). Transactions between neighbors may
be common in certain types of ad hoc networks (see for instance [5, 8]). In this case, there are better
reasons to assume bounds on the message delivery delays, because the nodes communicate directly
and not via intermediate forwarding nodes. Moreover, the underlying medium access control scheme
may also provide mechanisms (e.g., the optional RTS/CTS handshake in IEEE 802.11) that makes the
communication between neighboring nodes more reliable.
3.2 Limitations on misbehavior
We want that the protocol game of an exchange protocol models all the possible ways in which the
protocol participants can misbehave within the context of the protocol. The crucial point here is
to make the difference between misbehavior within the context of the protocol and misbehavior in
general. Letting the protocol participants misbehave in any way they can would lead to a game that
would allow interactions that have nothing to do with the protocol being studied. Therefore, we want
to limit the possible misbehavior of the protocol participants. However, we must do so in such a way
that we do not lose generality. Essentially, the limitation that we impose on protocol participants is
that they can send only messages that are compatible with the protocol. We make this more precise in
the following paragraph.
We consider an exchange protocol to be a description pi of a distributed computation that consists
of a set {pi1, pi2, . . .} of descriptions of local computations. For brevity, we call these descriptions
of local computations programs. Each program pik is meant to be executed by a protocol participant.
Typically, each pik contains instructions to wait for messages that satisfy certain conditions. When
such an instruction is reached, the local computation can proceed only if a message that satisfies the
required conditions is provided (or a timeout occurs). We call a message m compatible with pik if the
local computation described by pik can reach a state in which a message is expected and m would be
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accepted. Let us denote the set of messages that are compatible with pik by Mpik . Then, the set of
messages that are compatible with the protocol is defined as Mpi = ∪kMpik .
Apart from requiring the protocol participants to send messages that are compatible with the pro-
tocol, we do not impose further limitations on their behavior. In particular, we allow the protocol
participants to quit the protocol at any time, or to wait for some time without any activity. Further-
more, the protocol participants can send any messages (compatible with the protocol) that they are able
to compute in a given state. This also means that the protocol participants may alter the prescribed
order of the protocol messages (if this is not prevented deliberately by the design of the protocol).
On the other hand, we note that our model does not allow the protocol parties to run multiple
instances of the protocol in parallel (i.e., we do not consider interleaving attacks), and to eavesdrop or
modify messages sent between other parties of the protocol.
3.3 Players
We model each protocol participant (i.e., the two main parties and the trusted third party if there is
any) as a player. In addition, we model the communication network as a player too. Therefore, the
player set P of the protocol game is defined as P = {p1, p2, p3,net}, where p1 and p2 represent the
two main parties of the protocol, p3 stands for the trusted third party, and net denotes the network. If
the protocol does not use a trusted third party, then p3 is omitted. We denote the set P \ {net} by P ′.
It might seem that it is useless to model the trusted third party explicitly as a player, because it
always behaves correctly, and thus, its actions are fully predictable. However, usually, the payoffs
for the main parties depend on the state of the trusted third party, and it is easier to handle the state
transitions of the trusted third party if we explicitly model it as a player. In addition, modeling the
trusted third party in the same way as we model the other protocol participants leads to a more uni-
form model. After all, the trusted third party is a protocol participant. We will make the distinction
between the trusted third party and the potentially misbehaving main parties of the protocol in another
way: we restrict the player that represents the trusted third party to follow a particular strategy (the
one that represents the correct behavior), whereas we allow the players that represent the potentially
misbehaving main parties to choose among several strategies.
As we mentioned before, we assume that the protocol participants interact in synchronous rounds,
where every message sent in the first phase of a round is delivered in the second phase of the same
round. It might again seem that it is useless to model the network explicitly as a player, because the
only action it can perform is the delivery of the messages that were sent in the current round, and
therefore, it does not have choices. Nevertheless, we represent the network explicitly as a player. The
reason is that it seems to be easier to present the model if we explicitly include the message delivery
actions, because they clearly identify the second phases of the rounds, and thus, the points where the
states of the players change as the result of obtaining (partial) information about the actions performed
by the other players. In addition, modeling the network explicitly as a player makes it easier to extend
our model with unreliable networks, because such networks can be modeled as real players that can
choose between delivering a message or further delaying it.
3.4 Information sets
Each player i ∈ P has a local state Σi(q) that represents all the information that i has obtained
after the action sequence q. If for two action sequences q and q′, Σi(q) = Σi(q′), then q and q′ are
indistinguishable to i. Therefore, two action sequences q and q′ belong to the same information set of
i iff it is i’s turn to move after both q and q′, and Σi(q) = Σi(q′).
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We define two types of events: send and receive events. The send event snd(m, j) is generated
for player i ∈ P ′ when she submits a message m ∈ Mpi with intended destination j ∈ P ′ to the
network, and the receive event rcv(m) is generated for player i ∈ P ′ when the network delivers a
message m ∈Mpi to i. We denote the set of all events by E.
The local stateΣi(q) of player i ∈ P ′ after action sequence q is defined as a tuple 〈αi(q), Hi(q), ri(q)〉,
where
• αi(q) ∈ {true, false} is a boolean, which is true iff player i is still active after action sequence
q (i.e., she did not quit the protocol);
• Hi(q) ⊆ E × N is player i’s local history after action sequence q, which contains the events
that were generated for i together with the round number of their generation;
• ri(q) ∈ N is a non-negative integer that represents the round number for player i after action
sequence q.
Initially, αi(²) = true, Hi(²) = ∅, and ri(²) = 1 for every player i ∈ P ′.
The local state Σnet(q) of the network consists of a set Mnet(q) ⊆Mpi ×P ′×P ′ which contains
those messages together with their source and intended destination that were submitted to the network
and have not been delivered yet. We call Mnet(q) the network buffer. Initially, Mnet(²) = ∅.
3.5 Available actions
In order to determine the set of actions available for a player i ∈ P ′ after an action sequence q, we first
tag each message m ∈Mpi with a vector (φmi (Σi(q)))i∈P ′ of conditions. Each φmi (Σi(q)) is a logical
formula that describes the condition that must be satisfied by the local state Σi(q) of player i in order
for i to be able to send message m after action sequence q. Our intention is to use these conditions to
capture the assumptions about cryptographic primitives at an abstract level. For instance, it is often
assumed that a valid digital signature σi(m) of player i on message m can only be generated by i.
This means that a message m′ ∈ Mpi that contains σi(m) can be sent by a player j 6= i iff j received
a message that contained σi(m) earlier. This condition can be expressed by an appropriate logical
formula for every j 6= i.
While the formal derivation of the condition tags attached to the messages are currently not sup-
ported by our method, we had no particular problems deriving them for the protocols that we have
analyzed. The reason may be that each of the logical formulae is concerned with a single message,
or more precisely the conditions upon which that message can be sent by a given protocol participant.
Nevertheless, in our future work, we may develop a more systematic approach for this purpose in
order to avoid possible errors that this informal step might introduce in the analysis.
Now, let us consider an action sequence q, after which player i ∈ P ′ has to move. There are two
special actions, called idlei and quiti, which are always available for i after q. In addition to these
special actions, player i can choose a send action of the form sendi(M), where M is a subset of
the set Mi(Σi(q)) of messages that i is able to send in her current local state. Formally, we define
Mi(Σi(q)) as
Mi(Σi(q)) = {(m, j) : m ∈Mpi, φmi (Σi(q)) = true, j ∈ P ′ \ {i}}
The set Ai(Σi(q)) of available actions of player i ∈ P ′ after action sequence q is then defined as
Ai(Σi(q)) = {idlei, quiti} ∪ {sendi(M) :M ⊆Mi(Σi(q))}
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Note that sendi(∅) ∈ Ai(Σi(q)). By convention, sendi(∅) = idlei.
Let us consider now an action sequence q, after which the network has to move. Since the network
is assumed to be reliable, it should deliver every message that was submitted to it in the current round.
This means that there is only one action, called delivernet , that is available for the network after q,
which means the delivery of all messages in the network buffer. Thus,
Anet(Σnet(q)) = {delivernet}
The above defined actions change the local states of the players as follows:
• If a player i ∈ P ′ performs the action idlei, then the state of every player j ∈ P remains the
same as before.
Formally: for any action sequence q, after which player i ∈ P ′ has to move, we have that
Σj(q.idlei) = Σj(q)
for every j ∈ P .
• If a player i ∈ P ′ performs the action quiti, then the activity flag of i is set to false. The state
of every other player j ∈ P \ {i} remains the same as before.
Formally: for any action sequence q, after which player i ∈ P ′ has to move, we have that
αi(q.quiti) = false
Hi(q.quiti) = Hi(q)
ri(q.quiti) = ri(q)
and for every j ∈ P \ {i},
Σj(q.quiti) = Σj(q)
• If a player i ∈ P ′ performs an action sendi(M) such that M 6= ∅, then the messages in M are
inserted in the network buffer, and the corresponding send events are generated for i. The state
of every other player j ∈ P \ {i,net} remains the same as before.
Formally: for any action sequence q, after which player i ∈ P ′ has to move, and for any
available send action sendi(M) ∈ Ai(Σi(q)) such that M 6= ∅, we have that
αi(q.sendi(M)) = αi(q)
Hi(q.sendi(M)) = Hi(q) ∪ {(snd(m, j), ri(q)) : (m, j) ∈M}
ri(q.sendi(M)) = ri(q)
Mnet(q.sendi(M)) = Mnet(q) ∪ {(m, i, j) : (m, j) ∈M}
and for every j ∈ P \ {i,net},
Σj(q.sendi(M)) = Σj(q)
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• If the network performs the action delivernet , then for every message in the network buffer,
the appropriate receive event is generated for the intended destination of the message if it is
still active. Then, every message is removed from the network buffer, and the round number of
every active player is increased by one.
Formally: for any action sequence q, after which the network has to move, we have that
Mnet(q.delivernet) = ∅
and for every i ∈ P ′,
– if αi(q) = true, then
αi(q.delivernet) = αi(q)
Hi(q.delivernet) = Hi(q) ∪ {(rcv(m), ri(q)) : ∃j ∈ P ′ : (m, j, i) ∈Mnet(q)}
ri(q.delivernet) = ri(q) + 1
– otherwise
Σi(q.delivernet) = Σi(q)
3.6 Action sequences and player function
The game is played in repeated rounds, where each round consists of the following two phases: (1)
each active player in P ′ moves, one after the other, in order; (2) the network moves. The game is
finished when every player in P ′ becomes inactive.
In order to make this formal, let us denote the set of players that are still active after action
sequence q and have an index larger than v by P ′(q, v) (i.e., P ′(q, v) = {pk : pk ∈ P ′, αpk(q) =
true, k > v}). Furthermore, let us denote the smallest index in P ′(q, v) by kmin(q, v).
We define the set Q of action sequences and the player function p of the protocol game together
in an inductive manner. By definition, ² ∈ Q. Moreover, p(²) = p1. In addition,
• if an action sequence q is in Q and p(q) = pv, then
1. q.a ∈ Q for every a ∈ Apv(Σpv(q));
2. if P ′(q.a, v) 6= ∅, then p(q.a) = pkmin (q.a,v), otherwise p(q.a) = net ;
• if an action sequence q is in Q and p(q) = net , then
1. q.a ∈ Q for the single action a = delivernet ∈ Anet(Σnet(q));
2. if P ′(q.a, 0) 6= ∅, then p(q.a) = pkmin (q.a,0), otherwise q.a is a terminal action sequence,
and thus, p is not defined in q.a.
3.7 Payoffs
Now, we describe how the payoffs are determined. Let us consider the two main parties p1 and p2 of
the protocol, and the items γp1 and γp2 that they want to exchange. We denote the values that γp1 is
worth to p1 and p2 by u−p1 and u
+
p2 , respectively. Similarly, the values that γp2 is worth to p1 and p2
are denoted by u+p1 and u
−
p2 , respectively (see also Table 1).
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γp1 γp2
p1 u
−
p1 u
+
p1
p2 u
+
p2 u
−
p2
Table 1: The values that the items to be exchanged are worth to the protocol parties
Intuitively, u+i and u
−
i can be thought of as a potential gain and a potential loss of player i ∈
{p1, p2} in the game. In practice, it may be difficult to quantify u+i and u−i . However, our approach
does not depend on the exact values; we require only that u+i > u
−
i for both i ∈ {p1, p2}, which we
consider to be a necessary condition for the exchange to take place at all. In addition, we will assume
that u−i > 0.
The payoff yi(q) for player i ∈ {p1, p2} assigned to the terminal action sequence q is defined as
yi(q) = y+i (q) − y−i (q). We call y+i (q) the gain and y−i (q) the loss of player i, and define them as
follows:
y+i (q) =
{
u+i if φ
+
i (q) = true
0 otherwise
and
y−i (q) =
{
u−i if φ
−
i (q) = true
0 otherwise
where φ+i (q) and φ
−
i (q) are logical formulae. The exact form of φ
+
i (q) and φ
−
i (q) depends on the
particular exchange protocol being modeled, but the idea is that φ+i (q) = true iff i gains access
to γj (j 6= i), and φ−i (q) = true iff i loses control over γi in q. A typical example would be
φ+i (q) = (∃r : (rcv(m), r) ∈ Hi(q)), where we assume that m is the only message in Mpi that
contains γj .
Note that according to our model, the payoff yi(q) of player i can take only four possible values:
u+i , u
+
i − u−i , 0, and −u−i for every terminal action sequence q of the protocol game.
Since we are only interested in the payoffs of p1 and p2 (i.e., the players that represent the main
parties), we define the payoff of every other player in P \ {p1, p2} to be 0 for every terminal action
sequence of the protocol game.
3.8 Protocol vs. protocol game
Although the protocol game is constructed from the description of the protocol, it represents more
than the protocol itself, because it also encodes the possible misbehavior of the parties, which is not
specified in the protocol (at least not explicitly). Recall that a protocol is considered here to be a set of
programs pi = {pi1, pi2, . . .}. Each program pii must specify for the protocol participant that executes
it what to do in any conceivable situation. In this sense, a program is very similar to a strategy.
Therefore, we model the protocol itself as a set of strategies (one strategy for each program) in the
protocol game. We will denote the strategy that corresponds to pii by s∗i .
4 Formal definition of rational exchange and other properties
Informally, a two-party rational exchange protocol is an exchange protocol in which both main parties
are motivated to behave correctly and to follow the protocol faithfully. If one of the parties deviates
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from the protocol, then she may bring the other, correctly behaving party in a disadvantageous situ-
ation, but she cannot gain any advantages by the misbehavior. This is very similar to the concept of
Nash equilibrium in games. This inspired us to give a formal definition of rational exchange in terms
of a Nash equilibrium in the protocol game.
Before going further, we need to introduce the concept of restricted games. Let us consider
an extensive game G, and let us divide the player set P into two disjoint subsets Pfree and Pfix .
Furthermore, let us fix a strategy sj ∈ Sj for each j ∈ Pfix , and let us denote the vector (sj)j∈Pfix of
fixed strategies by s¯fix . The restricted game G|s¯fix is the extensive game that is obtained from G by
restricting each j ∈ Pfix to follow the fixed strategy sj .
Note that in G|s¯fix , only the players in Pfree can have several strategies; the players in Pfix are
bound to the fixed strategies in s¯fix . This means that the outcome of G|s¯fix solely depends on what
strategies are followed by the players in Pfree . In other words, the players in Pfix become pseudo
players, which are present, but do not have any influence on the outcome of the game.
For any player i ∈ Pfree and for any strategy si ∈ Si of player i, let si|s¯fix denote the strategy that
si induces in the restricted game G|s¯fix . In addition, let us denote the resulting outcome in G|s¯fix when
the players in Pfree follow the strategies in the strategy profile (si|s¯fix )i∈Pfree by o|s¯fix ((si|s¯fix )i∈Pfree ).
As we said before, we want to define the concept of rational exchange in terms of a Nash equilib-
rium in the protocol game. Indeed, we define it in terms of a Nash equilibrium in a restricted protocol
game. To be more precise, we consider the restricted protocol game that we obtain from the protocol
game by restricting the trusted third party (if there is any) to follow its program faithfully (i.e., to be-
have correctly), and we require that the strategies that correspond to the programs of the main parties
form a Nash equilibrium in this restricted protocol game. In addition, we require that no other Nash
equilibrium be strongly preferable for any of the main parties in the restricted game. This ensures
that the main parties have indeed no rational interest in deviating from the faithful execution of their
programs.
Definition 1 Let us consider a two-party exchange protocol pi = {pi1, pi2, pi3}, where pi1 and pi2 are
the programs for the main parties, and pi3 is the program for the trusted third party (if there is any).
Furthermore, let us consider the protocol game Gpi of pi constructed according to the framework
described in Section 3. Let us denote the strategy of player pk that belongs to the faithful execution of
pik within Gpi by s∗pk (k ∈ {1, 2, 3}), the single strategy of the network by s∗net , and the strategy vector
(s∗p3 , s
∗
net) by s¯.
• Rationality: pi is said to be rational iff
– (s∗p1|s¯, s
∗
p2|s¯) is a Nash equilibrium in the restricted protocol game Gpi|s¯; and
– both p1 and p2 prefer the outcome of (s∗p1|s¯, s∗p2|s¯) to the outcome of any other Nash equi-
librium in Gpi|s¯.
Besides rationality, our model allows us to define other properties of exchange protocols as well.
Most importantly, we can give a formal definition for the properties of fairness, effectiveness, and
termination. Informally, fairness means that if a party A behaves correctly, then the other party B
cannot get the item of A unless A gets the item of B. Effectiveness requires that if both parties
behave correctly, then both have access to the other’s item when the protocol is completed. Finally,
termination means that each correctly behaving party will eventually terminate execution.
Definition 2 Let us consider the notation introduced in Definition 1.
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• Fairness: pi is said to be fair iff
– for every strategy sp1|s¯ of p1, y+p1(q) > 0 implies y+p2(q) > 0, where q = o|s¯(sp1|s¯, s∗p2|s¯);
and
– for every strategy sp2|s¯ of p2, y+p2(q) > 0 implies y+p1(q) > 0, where q = o|s¯(s∗p1|s¯, sp2|s¯).
• Effectiveness: pi is said to be effective iff y+p1(q∗) > 0 and y+p2(q∗) > 0, where q∗ = o|s¯(s∗p1|s¯, s∗p2|s¯).
• Termination: pi is said to be terminating iff
– for every strategy sp1|s¯ of p1, there exists a finite prefix q′ of q, such that αp2(q′) = false,
where q = o|s¯(sp1|s¯, s∗p2|s¯); and
– for every strategy sp2|s¯ of p2, there exists a finite prefix q′ of q, such that αp1(q′) = false,
where q = o|s¯(s∗p1|s¯, sp2|s¯).
All the properties above are defined in the restricted game, where the trusted third party is re-
stricted to follow its program faithfully (i.e., to behave correctly). Fairness requires that if a player
follows the strategy that corresponds to the faithful execution of her program, then the other player can
have a positive gain only if the well behaving player also has a positive gain. Recall that having a pos-
itive gain represents a state where the player has access to the expected item. So our formal definition
corresponds to the informal characterization of fairness. Effectiveness requires that if both players
follow the strategy that corresponds to the faithful execution of their programs, then the outcome will
be an action sequence in which the gain of both players is positive (this represents a state, where both
players have access to the expected items). Finally, termination requires that if a player follows the
strategy that corresponds to the faithful execution of her program (i.e., she behaves correctly), then no
matter what strategy is played by the other player, the well behaving player will terminate computation
and reach an inactive state (i.e., she will perform the quit action) in a finite number of rounds.
In addition to the above definitions, we also define two other properties called gain closed property
and safe back out property that we will use later. The gain closed property requires that if a party A
gains access to the item of the other party B, then B loses control over the same item. The safe
back out property requires that if a party abandons the exchange right at the beginning without doing
anything else, then she will not lose control over her item (i.e., it is safe to back out of the exchange).
All the protocols that we are aware of satisfy these properties; we need to define them for technical
reasons only.
Definition 3 Let us consider the notation introduced in Definition 1.
• Gain closed property: pi is said to be gain closed iff for every terminal action sequence q of
Gpi|s¯ we have that y+p1(q) > 0 implies y
−
p2(q) > 0 and y
+
p2(q) > 0 implies y
−
p1(q) > 0.
• Safe back out property: Let Q′ = {(ak)wk=1 ∈ Q|s¯ : p|s¯((ak)wk=1) = p1, @v < w :
p|s¯((ak)vk=1) = p1}, and let s0p1|s¯ be the strategy of p1 that assigns quitp1 to every action
sequence in Q′. Similarly, let Q′′ = {(ak)wk=1 ∈ Q|s¯ : p|s¯((ak)wk=1) = p2, @v < w :
p|s¯((ak)vk=1) = p2}, and let s0p2|s¯ be the strategy of p2 that assigns quitp2 to every action
sequence in Q′′. pi satisfies the safe back out property iff
– for every strategy sp1|s¯ of p1, y−p2(q) = 0, where q = o|s¯(sp1|s¯, s0p2|s¯); and
– for every strategy sp2|s¯ of p2, y−p1(q) = 0, where q = o|s¯(s0p1|s¯, sp2|s¯).
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4.1 Relationship between rational and fair exchange
Proposition 1 If the protocol satisfies the effectiveness, gain closed, and safe back out properties,
then fairness implies rationality.
Proof: First, we have to prove that (s∗p1|s¯, s
∗
p2|s¯) is a Nash equilibrium in Gpi|s¯ where s¯ = (s
∗
p3 , s
∗
net).
Let us suppose that it is not. This means that either s∗p1|s¯ is not the best response to s
∗
p2|s¯, or s
∗
p2|s¯
is not the best response to s∗p1|s¯. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the first is the case.
This means that p1 has a strategy s′p1|s¯ such that playing s
′
p1|s¯ against s
∗
p2|s¯ yields a higher payoff
for p1 than the payoff that she gets if she plays s∗p1|s¯. In other words, yp1(q
∗) < yp1(q′), where
q∗ = o|s¯(s∗p1|s¯, s
∗
p2|s¯), and q
′ = o|s¯(s′p1|s¯, s
∗
p2|s¯). Since q
∗ is the outcome when both parties behave
correctly and, by assumption, the protocol is effective, we have that y+p1(q
∗) > 0 and y+p2(q
∗) > 0.
In addition, since the protocol is also gain closed, we get that y−p1(q
∗) > 0 and y−p2(q
∗) > 0. This
means that yp1(q∗) < yp1(q′) is possible only if y+p1(q
′) > 0 and y−p1(q
′) = 0 hold. However, this is
impossible, because, from the fairness property, y+p1(q
′) > 0 implies y+p2(q
′) > 0, and from the gain
closed property, y+p2(q
′) > 0 implies y−p1(q
′) > 0.
Next, we have to prove that no other Nash equilibrium is strongly preferable for any of the players.
Let us suppose the contrary, and assume that there exists a Nash equilibrium (s′p1|s¯, s
′
p2|s¯) in Gpi|s¯ such
that one of the players, say p1, has a higher payoff if (s′p1|s¯, s
′
p2|s¯) is played than if (s
∗
p1|s¯, s
∗
p2|s¯) is
played. This means that yp1(q∗) < yp1(q′), where q∗ = o|s¯(s∗p1|s¯, s
∗
p2|s¯), and q
′ = o|s¯(s′p1|s¯, s
′
p2|s¯).
For similar reasons as before, yp1(q∗) < yp1(q′) is possible only if y+p1(q
′) > 0 and y−p1(q
′) = 0
hold. Now, from the gain closed property, we get that y+p1(q
′) > 0 implies y−p2(q
′) > 0, and y−p1(q
′) =
0 implies y+p2(q
′) = 0. Therefore, the payoff yp2(q′) of p2 in q′ is negative. However, since the
protocol has the safe back out property, p2 can always do better, and achieve a non-negative payoff
by not participating in the exchange at all (i.e., quitting at the beginning of the protocol without doing
anything). This means that s′p2|s¯ is not the best response to s′p1|s¯, and thus, (s′p1|s¯, s′p2|s¯) cannot be a
Nash equilibrium. 2
We have just proved that fairness implies rationality. However, the reverse is not true in general.
In the next section, we will prove that the protocol proposed by Syverson in [27] is rational, but it is
clear that it does not provide fairness.
Our result shows that fairness is indeed a stronger requirement than rationality. Therefore, one
expects that rational exchange protocols are less complex and/or have fewer system requirements than
fair exchange protocols. This suggests that rational exchange can be viewed as a trade-off between
complexity and true fairness, and as such, it may provide interesting solutions to the exchange problem
in applications where fair exchange would be impossible or inefficient (e.g., in infrastructureless ad
hoc networks).
5 Analysis of the Syverson protocol
In this section, we analyze the rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson in [27] using our
protocol game model and our formal definition of rationality. The Syverson protocol is illustrated
in Figure 1, where A and B denote the two protocol participants; k−1A and k
−1
B denote their private
keys; itemA and itemB denote the items that they want to exchange2; dscA denotes the description of
itemA; and k denotes a randomly chosen secret key. In addition, enc is a symmetric-key encryption
2We took the liberty to replace Payment in the original protocol description with itemB in our description. This change
makes the protocol more general, and it has no effect on the properties of the protocol.
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A→ B : m1 = (dscA, enc(k, itemA), w(k), sig(k−1A , (dscA, enc(k, itemA), w(k))))
B → A : m2 = (itemB, m1, sig(k−1B , (itemB,m1)))
A→ B : m3 = (k, m2, sig(k−1A , (k,m2)))
Figure 1: Syverson’s rational exchange protocol
function that takes as input a key κ and a message µ, and outputs the encryption of µ with κ; sig is
a signature generation function that takes a private key κ−1i and a message µ, and returns a digital
signature on µ generated with κ−1i ; and w is a temporarily secret commitment function.
The idea of temporarily secret commitment is similar to that of commitment. The difference is that
the secrecy of the commitment is breakable within acceptable bounds on time (computation). More
precisely, if w is a temporarily secret commitment function, then given w(x), one can determine the
bit string x in time t, where t lies between acceptable lower and upper bounds. For details on how to
implement such a function, the reader is referred to [27].
In the first step of the protocol, A generates a random secret key k; encrypts itemA with k;
computes the temporarily secret commitment w(k); generates a digital signature on the description
dscA of itemA, the encryption of itemA, and the commitment w(k); and sends message m1 to B.
When B receives m1, she verifies the digital signature and the description dscA of the expected
item. If B is satisfied, then she sends message m2 to A. m2 contains itemB , the received message
m1, and a digital signature of B on these elements.
When A receives m2, she verifies the digital signature, checks if the received message contains
m1, and checks if the received item matches the expectations. If she is satisfied, then she sends the
key k to B in message m3, which also contains the received message m2 and the digital signature of
A on the message content.
When B receives m3, she verifies the digital signature, and checks if the received message con-
tains m2. Then, B decrypts the encrypted item in m1 (also received as part of m3) with the key
received in m3.
5.1 Observations
When B receives m1, she has something that either turns out to be what she wants or evidence that A
cheated, which can be used against A in a dispute. At this point, B might try to break the commitment
w(k) in order to obtain k and then itemA. However, this requires time. If itemA does not lose its
value in time, and the inconvenience of the delay (and the computation) is not an issue for B, then
breaking the commitment is indeed the best strategy for B. The Syverson protocol should not be used
in this case. So it is assumed that itemA has a diminishing value in time (e.g., it could be a short
term investment advice), and that it is practically worth nothing by the time at which B can break the
commitment [27]. Therefore, B is interested in continuing the protocol by sending m2 to A.
When A receives m2, she might not send m3 at all or for a long time. If A does not lose anything
until B gets access to itemA, then this is indeed a good strategy for A. If this is the case, then the
Syverson protocol should not be used. So it is assumed that A loses control over itemA by sending it
to B in m1, even if she sends it only in an encrypted form3. In this case, A does not gain anything by
not sending m3 to B promptly.
3More precisely, it is assumed that A loses the value that itemA represents for her when sending itemA in m1 even
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Note, however, that A may send some garbage instead of the encrypted item in m1. A deterrent
against this is that the commitment can be broken anyhow, which means that the misbehavior of A
can be discovered by B. In addition, since m1 is signed by A, it can be used against A in a dispute.
If some punishment (the value of which greatly exceeds the value of the exchanged items) for the
misbehavior can be enforced, then it is not in the interest of A to cheat. Note that this punishment
could be enforced externally (e.g., by law enforcement).
5.2 The set of compatible messages
In order to define the set of messages that are compatible with the protocol, we must first introduce
some further notation:
• the public keys of A and B are denoted by kA and kB , respectively;
• vfy is a signature verification function that takes a public key κi, a message µ, and a signature
σ, and returns true if σ is a valid signature on µ that can be verified with κi, otherwise it returns
false;
• dscB denotes the description of itemB;
• fit is a function that takes an item γ and an item description δ as inputs, and returns true if δ
matches γ, otherwise it returns false; and
• dec denotes the decryption function that belongs to enc, which takes a key κ and a ciphertext
ε, and returns the decryption of ε with κ.
Next, we reconstruct the programs of the protocol participants:
piA(A, k−1A , B, kB, itemA, dscA, dscB, k) =
1. compute ε = enc(k, itemA)
2. compute ω = w(k)
3. compute σ = sig(k−1A , (dscA, ε, ω))
4. send (dscA, ε, ω, σ) to B
5. wait until timeout or
a message m = (γ, µ, σ′) arrives such that
- µ = (dscA, ε, ω, σ)
- fit(γ, dscB) = true
- vfy(kB, (γ, µ), σ′) = true
6. if timeout then go to step 9
7. compute σ′′ = sig(k−1A , (k,m))
8. send (k,m, σ′′) to B
9. exit
piB(B, k−1B , A, kA, itemB, dscA) =
1. wait until timeout or
a message m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) arrives such that
though m1 is encrypted. An example would be when itemA is a result of some computation that has a cost for A. In
this case, the mere fact that A sends itemA in m1 means that A has already performed the computation, and thus, lost
something, although B has not gained anything yet.
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- δ = dscA
- vfy(kA, (δ, ε, ω), σ) = true
2. if timeout then go to step 6
3. compute σ′ = sig(k−1B , (itemB,m))
4. send (itemB,m, σ′) to A
5. wait until timeout or
a message m′ = (κ, µ, σ′′) arrives such that
- µ = (itemB,m, σ′)
- fit(dec(κ, ε), dscA) = true
- vfy(kA, (κ, µ), σ′′) = true
6. exit
Once the programs of the protocol participants are given, we can easily determine the set of
compatible messages:
Mpi =M1 ∪M2 ∪M3
where
M1 = {(δ, ε, ω, σ) : δ = dscA,
vfy(kA, (δ, ε, ω), σ) = true}
M2 = {(γ, µ, σ) : µ ∈M1,
fit(γ, dscB) = true,
vfy(kB, (γ, µ), σ) = true}
M3 = {(κ, γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′, σ′′) : (γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′) ∈M2,
fit(dec(κ, ε), dscA) = true,
vfy(kA, (κ, γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′), σ′′) = true}
5.3 The protocol game
Once the set Mpi of compatible messages is determined, we can construct the protocol game Gpi
of the protocol by applying the framework of Section 3. The player set of the protocol game is
P = {A,B,net}, where A and B represent the main parties, and net represents the network via
which the protocol participants communicate with each other. We assume that the network is reliable.
The information partition of each player i ∈ P is determined by i’s local state Σi(q). In order to
determine the available actions of the players in P ′ = P \ {net}, we must tag each message m ∈Mpi
with a vector (φmi (Σi(q)))i∈P ′ of logical formulae, where each formula φmi (Σi(q)) describes the
condition that must be satisfied in order for i to be able to send message m in the information set
represented by the local state Σi(q). For the Syverson protocol, these vectors of logical formulae are
the following:
• SinceB cannot generate valid digital signatures ofA,B can send a messagem ∈M1 only if she
receivedm or a message that containedm earlier. In addition, we assume thatA cannot generate
a fake item, different from itemA, that matches the description dscA of itemA. Similarly, we
assume that A cannot randomly generate a ciphertext ε, and a key κ or a commitment ω = w(κ)
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ϕ1(x˜, m˜, q˜) = ((∃r < rx˜(q˜) : (rcv(m˜), r) ∈ Hx˜(q˜)) ∨
(∃r < rx˜(q˜),m′ = (γ′, m˜, σ′) ∈M2 : (rcv(m′), r) ∈ Hx˜(q˜)) ∨
(∃r < rx˜(q˜),m′ = (κ′, γ′, m˜, σ′, σ′′) ∈M3 : (rcv(m′), r) ∈ Hx˜(q˜)))
ϕ2(x˜, m˜, q˜) = ((∃r < rx˜(q˜) : (rcv(m˜), r) ∈ Hx˜(q˜)) ∨
(∃r < rx˜(q˜),m′ = (κ′, m˜, σ′) ∈M3 : (rcv(m′), r) ∈ Hx˜(q˜)))
ϕ3(x˜, m˜, q˜) = (∃r < rx˜(q˜) : (rcv(m˜), r) ∈ Hx˜(q˜))
ϕ′(γ˜, q˜) = ((∃r < rB(q˜),m′ = (γ˜, µ′, σ′) ∈M2 : (rcv(m′), r) ∈ HB(q˜)) ∨
(∃r < rB(q˜),m′ = (κ′, γ˜, µ′, σ′, σ′′) ∈M3 : (rcv(m′), r) ∈ HB(q˜)))
Figure 2: Definition of ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, and ϕ′
such that dec(κ, ε) matches dscA. In other words, if for some message m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈M1,
fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) = true and dec(w−1(ω), ε) 6= itemA, then A can send m only if
she received m or a message that contains m earlier.
Formally, for any m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈M1:
– if fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) = false or dec(w−1(ω), ε) = itemA:
φmA (ΣA(q)) = (αA(q) = true)
φmB (ΣB(q)) = (αB(q) = true) ∧ ϕ1(B,m, q)
– otherwise (i.e., if fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) = true and dec(w−1(ω), ε) 6= itemA):
φmA (ΣA(q)) = (αA(q) = true) ∧ ϕ1(A,m, q)
φmB (ΣB(q)) = (αB(q) = true) ∧ ϕ1(B,m, q)
where ϕ1 is defined in Figure 2.
• Since A cannot generate valid digital signatures of B, A can send a message m ∈ M2 only if
she received m or a message that contains m earlier. For similar reasons, B can send a message
m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈ M2 only if she received µ ∈ M1 or a message that contains µ earlier. In
addition, we assume that B cannot generate a fake item, different from itemB , that matches
the description dscB of itemB . This means that if γ 6= itemB , then B can send m only if she
received γ or a message that contains γ earlier.
Formally, for any m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈M2:
– if γ = itemB:
φmA (ΣA(q)) = (αA(q) = true) ∧ ϕ2(A,m, q)
φmB (ΣB(q)) = (αB(q) = true) ∧ ϕ1(B,µ, q)
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– if γ 6= itemB:
φmA (ΣA(q)) = (αA(q) = true) ∧ ϕ2(A,m, q)
φmB (ΣB(q)) = (αB(q) = true) ∧ ϕ1(B,µ, q) ∧ ϕ′(γ, q)
where ϕ2 and ϕ′ are defined in Figure 2.
• Since B cannot generate valid digital signatures of A, B can send a message m ∈ M3 only
if she received m earlier (there cannot be another message that contains m in this case). For
similar reasons, A can send a message m = (κ, µ, σ) ∈ M3 only if she received µ ∈ M2 or
a message that contains µ earlier. Note, however, that in general, receiving µ is not sufficient
for A to be able to send m = (κ, µ, σ), because if the ciphertext ε within µ was not computed
by A using the key κ (e.g., if A generated ε randomly), then A may not be able to guess κ.
Nevertheless, since our proofs will rely only on the fact that A must receive µ before sending
m = (κ, µ, σ), we generously give A the power to guess κ, and we consider that receiving µ is
also sufficient for A to be able to send m = (κ, µ, σ).
Formally, for any m = (κ, µ, σ) ∈M3:
φmA (ΣA(q)) = (αA(q) = true) ∧ ϕ2(A,µ, q)
φmB (ΣB(q)) = (αB(q) = true) ∧ ϕ3(B,m, q)
where ϕ3 is defined in Figure 2.
The above logical formulae allow us to complete the construction of the protocol game. Before
determining the payoffs and describing the strategies that correspond to the programs of the protocol
participants, we can already make a few simple statements:
Lemma 1 If (snd(m,B), r) ∈ HA(q) for some message m = (κ, µ, σ) ∈M3, round number r ∈ N,
and action sequence q ∈ Q, then there exists r′ < r such that (rcv(µ), r′) ∈ HA(q).
Lemma 2 If (snd(m,A), r) ∈ HB(q) for some message m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈M2, round number r ∈ N,
and action sequence q ∈ Q, then there exists r′ < r such that (rcv(µ), r′) ∈ HB(q).
Lemma 3 Let m be a message in M3. There is no round number r < 3 and action sequence q ∈ Q
such that (rcv(m), r) ∈ HB(q).
Lemma 4 Let m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) be a message in M1 such that fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) = true and
dec(w−1(ω), ε) 6= itemA. There is no player i ∈ P ′, round number r ∈ N, and action sequence
q ∈ Q such that (rcv(m), r) ∈ Hi(q).
Lemma 5 Let m = (γ, µ, σ) be a message in M2 such that γ 6= itemB . There is no player i ∈ P ′,
round number r ∈ N, and action sequence q ∈ Q such that (rcv(m), r) ∈ Hi(q).
Lemma 1 states that if A sends a message m = (κ, µ, σ) ∈ M3 in round r in q, then she must
receive µ in an earlier round r′ < r in q. Similarly, Lemma 2 states that if B sends a message
m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈M2 in round r in q, then she must receive µ in an earlier round r′ < r in q. Lemma 3
is a corollary of the first two lemmas that states that B cannot receive a message m ∈ M3 before
round 3. Finally, Lemma 4 states that no player can ever receive a message m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈ M1
such that fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) = true and dec(w−1(ω), ε) 6= itemA, and Lemma 5 states that
no player can ever receive a message m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈M2 such that γ 6= itemB . The proofs of these
lemmas are rather straightforward, and can be found in the Appendix.
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5.4 Strategies
Based on the programs of the protocol participants described in Subsection 5.2, we can construct the
strategies that correspond to the correct behavior of the parties:
Strategy s∗A
• If αA(q) = true and rA(q) = 1, then perform the action sendA({(m1, B)}), where m1 is as
defined in Figure 1.
• If αA(q) = true and rA(q) = 2, then perform the action idleA.
• If αA(q) = true and rA(q) = 3, then let M be the set of those messages m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈ M2
for which µ = m1 and there exists a round number r < 3 such that (rcv(m), r) ∈ HA(q). Note
that because of Lemma 5, either M = ∅ or M is a singleton {m} where m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈ M2,
γ = itemB , and µ = m1.
– If M = ∅, then perform the action quitA.
– If M = {m}, then perform the action sendA({((k,m, sig(k−1A , (k,m))), B)}).
• If αA(q) = true and rA(q) = 4, then perform the action quitA.
Strategy s∗B
• If αB(q) = true and rB(q) = 1, then perform the action idleB .
• If αB(q) = true and rB(q) = 2, then let M be the set of those messages m ∈ M1 for which
there exists a round number r < 2 such that (rcv(m), r) ∈ HB(q).
– If M = ∅, then perform the action quitB .
– If M 6= ∅, then choose the smallest message m from M according to some order-
ing of the messages (e.g., the lexical ordering of bit strings), and perform the action
sendB({((itemB,m, sig(k−1B , (itemB,m))), A)})
• If αB(q) = true and rB(q) = 3, then perform the action idleB .
• If αB(q) = true and rB(q) = 4, then perform the action quitB .
5.5 Payoffs
We must slightly modify the payoff framework introduced in Subsection 3.7, in order to take into ac-
count that the value of itemA diminishes in time4. We also have to consider the potential punishment
for A if she sends garbage in the first message of the protocol. Taking these into consideration, we
define the payoffs of the players as follows.
Let us consider a terminal action sequence q in the protocol game. The payoff of A in q is
yA(q) = y+A(q) − y−A(q), where y+A(q) is the gain and y−A(q) is the loss of A in q. Furthermore,
the loss of A is defined as y−A(q) = y∗A(q) + y∗∗A (q), where y∗A(q) is the loss that stems from losing
4We note that time variant values of items lead to time variant payoffs, and the definition of fairness introduced in
Section 4 may not be adequate if payoffs are time variant. Since we are not concerned with fairness here, this does not effect
our results.
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φ+A(q) = (∃r ∈ N,m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈M2 :
(γ = itemB) ∧ ((rcv(m), r) ∈ HA(q)))
φ∗A(q) = (∃r ∈ N,m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈M1 :
(dec(w−1(ω), ε) = itemA) ∧ ((snd(m,B), r) ∈ HA(q))) ∨
(∃r ∈ N,m = (κ, γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′, σ′′) ∈M3 :
(dec(κ, ε) = itemA) ∧ ((snd(m,B), r) ∈ HA(q)))
φ∗∗A (q) = (∃r ∈ N,m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈M1 :
(fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) = false) ∧ ((snd(m,B), r) ∈ HA(q)))
φ+B(q, r) = (∃m = (κ, γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′, σ′′) ∈M3 :
(dec(κ, ε) = itemA) ∧ ((rcv(m), r) ∈ HB(q))) ∧
(@r′ < r,m = (κ, γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′, σ′′) ∈M3 :
(dec(κ, ε) = itemA) ∧ ((rcv(m), r′) ∈ HB(q)))
φ−B(q) = (∃r ∈ N,m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈M2 :
(γ = itemB) ∧ ((snd(m,A), r) ∈ HB(q)))
Figure 3: Definition of φ+A, φ∗A, φ∗∗A , φ
+
B , and φ
−
B
control over itemA, and y∗∗A (q) is the loss that stems from the punishment. The payoff of B in q is
yB(q) = y+B(q)− y−B(q), where y+B(q) is the gain and y−B(q) is the loss of B in q.
We denote the values that itemA and itemB are worth to A by u−A and u
+
A, respectively. Similarly,
we denote the value that itemB is worth toB by u−B . The diminishing value of itemA forB is modeled
as a function u+B(r), which decreases as the round number r increases (see part (a) of Figure 4). We
assume that there exists a round number R such that u+B(r) = 0 for every r ≥ R, and that breaking a
commitment requires more than R rounds. Finally, the value of the punishment is denoted by F . We
assume that F is much greater than u+A, u
+
A > u
−
A > 0, and u
+
B(3) > u
−
B > 0 (see also part (b) of
Figure 4).
The gain of A is u+A if A receives a message in M2 that contains itemB , otherwise it is 0. The
value of y∗A(q) is u
−
A if A sends a message in M1 that contains itemA (in an encrypted form), or if
A sends a message in M3 that contains itemA (in an encrypted form), otherwise it is 0. In addition,
the punishment y∗∗A (q) of A is F if she sends an incorrect message in M1 that, after breaking the
commitment and decrypting the ciphertext in the message, yields an item that does not match the
description dscA; otherwise the punishment is 0.
The gain of B is u+B(r) if B receives a message in M3 in round r that contains itemA and no such
message is received before round r. Note that receiving only a message in M1 yields no gain for B,
because we assume that by the time at which the commitment can be broken, itemA loses its value
for B. The loss of B is u−B if B sends a message in M2 that contains itemB , otherwise it is 0.
The formal definitions are given below:
y+A(q) =
{
u+A if φ
+
A(q) = true
0 otherwise
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Figure 4: The diminishing value of itemA for B is represented by a decreasing function u+B(r). We
assume that there exists a round number R such that u+B(r) = 0 for every r ≥ R, and that breaking a
commitment requires more than R rounds. We also assume that u+B(3) > u
−
B > 0. Finally, we define
r0 as the smallest round number such that u+B(r0) ≤ u+B(3)− u−B .
y∗A(q) =
{
u−A if φ∗A(q) = true
0 otherwise
y∗∗A (q) =
{
F if φ∗∗A (q) = true
0 otherwise
y+B(q) =

u+B(1) if φ
+
B(q, 1) = true
u+B(2) if φ
+
B(q, 2) = true
. . .
u+B(R− 1) if φ+B(q,R− 1) = true
0 otherwise
y−B(q) =
{
u−B if φ
−
B(q) = true
0 otherwise
where φ+A, φ∗A, φ∗∗A , φ
+
B , and φ
−
B are defined in Figure 3. Note that, by definition, φ
+
B(q, r) = true
holds for exactly one r, so y+B(q) is well defined.
5.6 Proof of rationality
Our proof of rationality relies on the fact that the Syverson protocol is closed for gains and it satisfies
the safe back out property:
Lemma 6 The Syverson protocol is closed for gains.
Lemma 7 The Syverson protocol satisfies the safe back out property.
The proofs of these lemmas are rather straightforward, and can be found in the Appendix.
In order to prove that the Syverson protocol is rational, we have to prove that the strategies s∗A and
s∗B , which correspond to the correct behavior of the parties, form a Nash equilibrium in the protocol
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game that we have constructed in Subsections 5.3 and 5.5. In addition, we also have to prove that no
other Nash equilibrium is strongly preferable for any of the parties.
Lemma 8 The strategy profile (s∗A|s¯, s∗B|s¯) is a Nash equilibrium in the restricted protocol gameGpi|s¯,
where s¯ = (s∗net).
Proof: We have to prove that (i) s∗A|s¯ is the best response to s∗B|s¯, and (ii) s∗B|s¯ is the best response to
s∗A|s¯.
(i) Suppose that there is a strategy s′A|s¯ for A such that the payoff of A is higher if she plays s′A|s¯
than if she plays s∗A|s¯ against s
∗
B|s¯. This means that yA(q
′) > yA(q∗), where q∗ = o|s¯(s∗A|s¯, s
∗
B|s¯) and
q′ = o|s¯(s′A|s¯, s
∗
B|s¯). It is easy to verify that yA(q
∗) = u+A − u−A. Thus, yA(q′) > yA(q∗) is possible
only if y+A(q′) = u
+
A, y
∗
A(q
′) = 0, and y∗∗A (q′) = 0.
From y+A(q
′) = u+A, it follows that A received a message m = (γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′) ∈ M2 in q′
such that γ = itemB . This means that B sent m in q′. It follows from Lemma 2 that B can send
m only if it received (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈ M1 from A earlier. Thus, A sent (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈ M1. Since
y∗∗A (q
′) = 0, fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) must be true. Furthermore, from Lemma 4, we get that
dec(w−1(ω), ε) = itemA. This means that y∗A(q′) cannot be 0.
(ii) Suppose that there is a strategy s′B|s¯ for B such that the payoff of B is higher if she plays s′B|s¯
than if she plays s∗B|s¯ against s
∗
A|s¯. This means that yB(q
′) > yB(q∗), where q∗ = o|s¯(s∗A|s¯, s
∗
B|s¯) and
q′ = o|s¯(s∗A|s¯, s
′
B|s¯). It is easy to verify that yB(q
∗) = u+B(3) − u−B . Let r0 be the smallest round
number such that u+B(r0) ≤ u+B(3)−u−B (see part (b) of Figure 4). Then, yB(q′) > yB(q∗) is possible
only in two cases: (a) y+B(q′) = u+B(r), where r < r0, and y−B(q′) = 0, or (b) y+B(q′) = u+B(r), where
r < 3. However, case (b) can never occur, because of Lemma 3. Therefore, we have to consider only
case (a).
From y+B(q
′) = u+B(r), it follows that B received a message m = (κ, γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′, σ′′) ∈ M3
such that dec(κ, ε) = itemA in round r in q′. This means that A sent m in q′. It follows from
Lemma 1 that A can send m only if it received (γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′) ∈ M2 from B earlier. Thus, B sent
(γ, δ, ε, ω, σ, σ′) ∈ M2. From Lemma 5, we get that γ = itemB . This means that y−B(q′) cannot be
0. 2
Lemma 9 Both A and B prefer (s∗A|s¯, s∗B|s¯) to any other Nash equilibrium in Gpi|s¯, where s¯ = (s∗net).
Proof: Let us suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium (s′A|s¯, s
′
B|s¯) in Gpi|s¯ such that yA(q
′) >
yA(q∗) = u+A − u−A, where q′ = o|s¯(s′A|s¯, s′B|s¯) and q∗ = o|s¯(s∗A|s¯, s∗B|s¯). This is possible only if
y+A(q
′) = u+A and y∗A(q′) = y∗∗A (q′) = 0. Since the protocol is closed for gains, y
+
A(q
′) = u+A > 0
implies y−B(q′) > 0, and y
−
A(q
′) = 0 implies y+B(q′) = 0. Therefore, if A follows s′A|s¯ and B follows
s′B|s¯, then B’s payoff is yB(q
′) = y+B(q
′)− y−B(q′) < 0. Note, however, that because of the safe back
out property, if B quits at the beginning of the game without doing anything else, then her payoff
cannot be negative, whatever strategy is followed by A. This means that s′B|s¯ is not the best response
to s′A|s¯, and thus, (s
′
A|s¯, s
′
B|s¯) cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Now let us suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium (s′A|s¯, s
′
B|s¯) in Gpi|s¯ such that yB(q
′) >
yB(q∗) = u+B(3)− u−B . This is possible only in two cases: (a) if y+p2(q′) = u+B(r), where r < r0 (see
part (b) of Figure 4), and y−B(q′) = 0, or (b) if y+B(q′) = u+B(r), where r < 3. However, case (b) can
never occur, because of Lemma 3. Case (a) can be proven to be impossible using the same technique
as in the first part of this proof. 2
From Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, we obtain the following:
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Proposition 2 The Syverson protocol is rational.
5.7 Towards an asynchronous model
In the previous subsection, we proved that Syverson’s exchange protocol [27] is rational. However,
the proof has been carried out in a model where the network is assumed to be reliable. What if we
relax this assumption and allow an unreliable network (i.e., if we assume that there are no bounds on
message delivery delays)?
In order to answer this question, our model should be extended with the notion of unreliable
network. This can easily be done by giving choices to the network. More precisely, instead of defining
the set of available actions for the network as a singleton {delivernet}, which means that at the end of
each round the network delivers every message that is in the network buffer, we can define the set of
available actions for the network as
Anet(Σnet(q)) = {delivernet(M) :M ⊆Mnet(q)}
which means that the network can deliver any subset of the messages that are currently in the net-
work buffer. Thus, depending on the strategy followed by the network, some messages would not be
delivered immediately, but they could stay in the network buffer for some time, even forever.
Note that giving choices to the network to delay the delivery of some messages as described above
leads to a more general but still synchronous model, since each player’s local state still contains the
same current round number. It is possible to define a fully asynchronous model (see [4]), but we do
not need it in the following discussion.
On the other hand, we need to extend the definition of rationality, since we must take into account
that now the network has several strategies. An easy way to do this is to allow that the strategy vector
s¯ with which the protocol game is restricted can contain any possible strategy of the network, and to
require that the conditions of rationality are satisfied in every possible restricted protocol game Gpi|s¯,
where s¯ = (s∗p3 , snet), and snet ranges over all the possible strategies of the network. Note that in
order to ensure that each player pi has a unique faithful strategy s∗pi , we must require that pi has fixed
timeout values that specify how many rounds pi waits for a given type of message.
Let us examine if the Syverson protocol satisfies this extended definition of rationality. Let us
assume that both players follow the strategy that corresponds to the faithful execution of the protocol.
Furthermore, in order to guarantee the uniqueness of these faithful strategies, let us assume that each
of these strategies uses fixed timeout parameters as described above. Now, the network may follow
a strategy in which m3 is delayed, so that B finally timeouts and quits the protocol. This means that
there exists a strategy vector s¯, and thus a restricted protocol game Gpi|s¯, such that y+B(q∗) = 0 and
y−B(q
∗) = u−B (since m2 has been sent), where q∗ = o|s¯(s∗A|s¯, s∗B|s¯). Note that the total payoff of B
in q∗ is negative, so B would be better off if she did not participate in the exchange at all. In other
words, s∗B|s¯ is not the best response to s
∗
A|s¯ in Gpi|s¯, and so (s
∗
A|s¯, s
∗
B|s¯) cannot be a Nash equilibrium
in Gpi|s¯. This means that the protocol is not rational in this extended model.
6 Related work
Formal definitions for fair exchange are given by Gaertner et al. in [12, 22]. They adopt the formalism
of concurrency theory and define fairness based on safety and liveness properties. Although their
proposal certainly has a strong potential, it is somewhat limited to fair exchange, and in particular to
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the concept of strong and weak fairness5 as it was defined by Asokan in [1]. They do not attempt
to formalize the concept of rational exchange, nor to investigate the relationship between rational
exchange and fair exchange.
Kremer and Raskin describe a formal approach to the analysis of non-repudiation protocols (which
are strongly related to fair exchange protocols) in [17]. They model non-repudiation protocols as
games in a similar way as we do. However, they use neither payoffs nor the concept of equilibrium to
specify properties of the protocol. Instead, they introduce a game based alternating temporal logic for
this purpose, and use model checking to verify that the protocol satisfies its specification. The paper
does not try to formalize the concept of rational exchange nor to relate it to fair exchange.
In [23], Sandholm proposes a method for managing an exchange between two agents – a supplier
and a demander – so that the gains from completing the exchange at any point are larger for both agents
than the gains from aborting it. The method consists in splitting the exchange into small chunks in
a way that the agents can avoid situations that motivate either of them to defect. Sandholm calls this
type of exchange unenforced exchange (since it does not rely on enforcement from an external trusted
party), and relates it to Nash equilibrium. However, he does not formalize the concept of rational
exchange in general (the proposed method can be viewed as a particular rational exchange protocol),
nor does he relate his results to fair exchange.
In [3], Asokan et al. define a formal security model for fair signature exchange. The model is
described in terms of a “game”, in which a correctly behaving party A and the trusted third party act
in a purely reactive fashion, while the actions of the misbehaving party B∗ are restricted only by a
few rules. B∗ wins the game if it can obtain the digital signature of A on some message m without
A obtaining the digital signature of B∗ on another message m′. They define fairness to mean that the
probability that B∗ wins the game is negligible (with respect to some security parameter). Although,
at first sight, the formal model of Asokan et al. might seem to be similar to our approach, in fact, it
is completely different. First of all, apart from using the terms game and player, their approach has
little to do with game theory as they do not use the notion of equilibrium. Their model is much more
similar to the standard models that are used in the cryptographic literature to prove the security of
cryptographic algorithms, where one explicitly states the assumptions made about the power of the
adversary and tries to prove that the system cannot be broken without invalidating those assumptions.
As opposed to this, we completely abstract away cryptography in our model. While the formal model
of Asokan et al. is probably the most rigorous model that can be found in the literature regarding
fairness, it is somewhat restricted to signature exchange protocols. In addition, it does not seem to
be appropriate to capture the notion of rationality, which is not a limitation itself, since it was not the
goal of the authors to formalize the concept of rational exchange.
Various other approaches to formal analysis of fair exchange protocols are described in [24, 10,
25], but these papers are only loosely related to our work as they do not use game theory (although the
model of [10] could easily be related to a game) and they are concerned with fair exchange instead of
rational exchange.
7 Conclusion
We presented a formal model of exchange protocols based on game theory, and gave a formal def-
inition for rational exchange and various other properties of exchange protocols, including fairness,
within this model. Our model helped us to better understand rational exchange by relating it to the
5Strong and weak fairness have nothing to do with the distinction between fairness and rationality.
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well-known concept of Nash equilibrium in games. In addition, it also allowed us to study the re-
lationship between rationality and fairness. More specifically, we obtained a formal justification for
the intuition that fairness is a stronger requirement than rationality by proving that fairness implies
rationality, but the reverse is not true in general.
We illustrated the use of our model for the analysis of existing rational exchange protocols by
providing a thorough analysis of a rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson. We have proved
that the Syverson protocol is rational in our model assuming that communication between the protocol
parties is reliable. However, as we have seen, if this assumption is relaxed, then the rationality property
is lost.
The most original contribution of the paper is the usage of game theory as a tool for modeling and
analyzing security protocols. It shows that game theory can successfully be used for such a task. In
fact, we believe that it is the most appropriate tool for modeling rational exchange in particular.
Our work was motivated by the “unusual” requirements that designers of exchange protocols
should consider in wireless ad hoc networks. We argued that fair exchange protocols (with and with-
out a trusted third party) may not satisfy these requirements. The question that arises is if the Syverson
protocol and rational exchange protocols in general are useful in this context. We can only partially
answer this question. On the one hand, the Syverson protocol is rational only under the assump-
tion that the communication channel between the protocol parties is reliable. As such, its possible
application in ad hoc networks is limited: it may be used between neighboring nodes where there
may be good reasons to assume bounds on the message delivery delays, while it certainly cannot be
used between distant nodes where bounds on message delivery delays are unrealistic to assume. This
argument applies to any synchronous rational exchange protocol (i.e., any exchange protocol that is
rational only under the reliable channel assumption). On the other hand, we note that the existence
of asynchronous rational exchange protocols (i.e., exchange protocols that are rational even if the re-
liable channel assumption is relaxed) is an open question. We encourage researchers to consider this
question, and if the response is affirmative, to design asynchronous rational exchange protocols.
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Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1
The lemma states that if A sends a message m = (κ, µ, σ) ∈ M3 in round r in q, then she must
receive µ in an earlier round r′ < r in q.
Proof: Let us suppose that A sends m in round r in q, but she does not receive µ before round r in
q. It can be seen from the formulae with which we tagged the messages in M3 that A can send m in
round r only if she receives µ or a message in M3 that contains µ in an earlier round. By assumption,
A does not receive µ before round r, and thus, A must receive a message in M3 that contains µ before
round r.
Let M3(µ) = {(κ′, µ′, σ′) ∈ M3 : µ′ = µ} (i.e., M3(µ) contains those messages in M3 that
contain µ). Let r∗ be the earliest round in q in which A receives a message in M3(µ), and let this
message be m∗. Such r∗ and m∗ exist because (i) we know that A must receive a message in M3(µ)
before round r in q, and (ii) round numbers are positive integers. In addition, from (i), we get that
r∗ < r must hold.
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Since the network is reliable, ifA receivesm∗ in round r∗, thenB sendsm∗ in round r∗. However,
it can be seen from the formulae with which we tagged the messages in M3 that this is possible only
if B receives m∗ in an earlier round rˆ < r∗. This means that A sends m∗ in round rˆ. Again from
the formulae with which we tagged the messages in M3, it can be seen that A can send m∗ ∈M3(µ)
in round rˆ only if she receives µ or a message in M3(µ) before round rˆ. By assumption, A cannot
receive µ before round rˆ < r∗ < r. Thus, she must receive a message in M3(µ) before round rˆ. But
this contradicts the fact that the earliest round in which such a message is received by A is r∗. 2
Lemma 2
The lemma states that if B sends a message m = (γ, µ, σ) ∈ M2 in round r in q, then she must
receive µ in an earlier round r′ < r in q.
Proof: Let us suppose that B sends m in round r in q, but she does not receive µ before round r in
q. It can be seen from the formulae with which we tagged the messages in M2 that B can send m in
round r only if she receives µ or a message in M2 or in M3 that contains µ in an earlier round. By
assumption, B does not receive µ before round r, and thus, B must receive a message in M2 or in M3
that contains µ before round r.
Let M2(µ) = {(γ′, µ′, σ′) ∈ M2 : µ′ = µ} and M3(µ) = {(κ′, γ′, µ′, σ′, σ′′) ∈ M3 : µ′ = µ}
(i.e., M2(µ) and M3(µ) contain those messages in M2 and in M3, respectively, that contain µ). If
B does not receive any message in M2(µ) before round r in q, then let r∗2 = r, otherwise, let r∗2 be
the earliest round in q in which B receives a message in M2(µ). Similarly, if B does not receive any
message in M3(µ) before round r in q, then let r∗3 = r, otherwise, let r∗3 be the earliest round in q in
which B receives a message in M3(µ).
Now, we can distinguish two cases: (a) r∗2 ≤ r∗3 and (b) r∗3 < r∗2.
Case (a): Recall that B must receive a message in M2(µ) or in M3(µ) before round r in q. This is
not possible if r = r∗2. Thus, r∗2 < r must hold. This also means that B receives a message in M2(µ)
in round r∗2. Let us denote this message by m∗2.
If B receives m∗2 in round r∗2, then A sends m∗2 in round r∗2. However, it can be seen from the
formulae with which we tagged the messages in M2 that A can send m∗2 in round r∗2 only if she
receives (i) m∗2 or (ii) a message m′3 = (κ′,m∗2, σ′) ∈ M3(µ) in an earlier round rˆ < r∗2. We show
that neither (i) nor (ii) is possible.
(i) If A receives m∗2 ∈ M2(µ) in round rˆ, then B sends m∗2 in round rˆ. It can be seen from the
formulae with which we tagged the messages in M2 that this is possible only if B receives µ or a
message in M2(µ) or in M3(µ) before round rˆ. By assumption, B does not receive µ before round r.
Thus, B must receive a message in M2(µ) or in M3(µ) before round rˆ < r∗2 ≤ r∗3. However, because
of the definitions of r∗2 and r∗3, B cannot receive any message in M2(µ) before r∗2 and any message in
M3(µ) before r∗3.
(ii) If A receives m′3 = (κ′,m∗2, σ′) ∈ M3(µ) in round rˆ, then B sends m′3 in round rˆ. It can
be seen from the formulae with which we tagged the messages in M3 that this is possible only if B
receives m′3 before round rˆ < r∗2 ≤ r∗3. However, because of the definition of r∗3, B cannot receive
any message in M3(µ) before round r∗3.
Case (b): If r∗3 < r∗2, then r∗3 < r must also hold (since otherwise r∗2 would be greater than r, which
is not possible by definition). This means that B receives a message in M3(µ) in round r∗3. Let this
message be m∗3 = (κ∗, γ∗, µ, σ∗, σ∗∗). If B receives m∗3 in round r∗3, then A sends m∗3 in round r∗3.
However, from Lemma 1, we know that A can send m∗3 in round r∗3 only if she receives a message
m′2 = (γ∗, µ, σ∗) ∈ M2(µ) in an earlier round rˆ < r∗3. This means that B sends m′2 in round rˆ. It
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can be seen from the formulae with which we tagged the messages in M2 that this is possible only if
B receives µ or a message in M2(µ) or in M3(µ) before round rˆ. By assumption, B does not receive
µ before round r. Thus, B must receive a message in M2(µ) or in M3(µ) before round rˆ < r∗3 < r∗2.
However, because of the definitions of r∗2 and r∗3, B cannot receive any message in M2(µ) before
round r∗2 and any message in M3(µ) before round r∗3. 2
Lemma 3
The lemma states that B cannot receive a message m ∈M3 before round 3.
Proof: Let us assume that B receives m = (κ, γ, µ, σ, σ′) in round r, where r < 3. This means that
A sends m in round r. According to Lemma 1, this is possible only if A receives m′ = (γ, µ, σ) in an
earlier round r′ < r. Thus, B sends m′ in round r′. According to Lemma 2, this is possible only if B
receives µ in an earlier round r′′ < r′ < r. But this is impossible, since round numbers are positive
integers, and r < 3. 2
Lemma 4
The lemma states that no player can ever receive a message m = (δ, ε, ω, σ) ∈ M1 such that
fit(dec(w−1(ω), ε), dscA) = true and dec(w−1(ω), ε) 6= itemA.
Proof: Let us suppose that there exist a player i ∈ P ′, a round number r ∈ N, and an action sequence
q ∈ Q such that (rcv(m), r) ∈ Hi(q). This means that a player j sends m in round r in q. According
to the logical formulae with which we tagged the messages in M1, this is possible only if j receives
m or a message in M2 or in M3 that contains m before round r – no matter whether j is A or B.
Let M2(m) = {(γ′, µ′, σ′) ∈ M2 : µ′ = m} and M3(m) = {(κ′, γ′, µ′, σ′, σ′′) ∈ M3 : µ = m}.
If no player receives m before round r in q, then let r∗1 = r, otherwise let r∗1 be the earliest round in
q in which m is received by any of the players. If no player receives any message in M2(m) before
round r in q, then let r∗2 = r, otherwise let r∗2 be the earliest round in q in which a message in M2(m)
is received by any of the players. Finally, if no player receives any message in M3(m) before round
r in q, then let r∗3 = r, otherwise let r∗3 be the earliest round in q in which a message in M3(m) is
received by any of the players.
Now, we can distinguish three cases: (a) r∗1 ≤ r∗2, r∗3, (b) r∗2 ≤ r∗1, r∗3, and (c) r∗3 ≤ r∗1, r∗2.
Case (a): Recall that j receives m or a message in M2(m) or in M3(m) before round r in q. Note
that if r∗1 = r, then no player receives m or any message in M2(m) or in M3(m) before round r in
q. Thus, r∗1 < r must hold. This means that a player receives m in round r∗1. If a player receives m
in round r∗1, then a player must send m in round r∗1. According to the logical formulae with which
we tagged the messages in M1, this is possible only if that player receives m or a message in M2(m)
or in M3(m) in an earlier round rˆ < r∗1 ≤ r∗2, r∗3. However, because of the definitions of r∗1, r∗2, and
r∗3, no player can receive m before round r∗1, a message in M2(m) before round r∗2, and a message in
M3(m) before round r∗3.
Case (b): Recall that j receives m or a message in M2(m) or in M3(m) before round r in q. Note
that if r∗2 = r, then no player receives m or any message in M2(m) or in M3(m) before round r in q.
Thus, r∗2 < r must hold. This means that a player receives a message m′ = (γ′,m, σ′) ∈ M2(m) in
round r∗2. If a player receives m′ in round r∗2, then a player must send m′ in round r∗2. According to
the logical formulae with which we tagged the messages in M2, A can send m′ in round r∗2 only if she
receives m′ ∈ M2(m) or a message in M3(m) that contains m′ in an earlier round rˆ < r∗2 ≤ r∗1, r∗3.
Furthermore, B can send m′ in round r∗2 only if it receives m or a message in M2(m) or in M3(m) in
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an earlier round r˜ < r∗2 ≤ r∗1, r∗3. However, because of the definitions of r∗1, r∗2, and r∗3, no player can
receive m before round r∗1, a message in M2(m) before round r∗2, and a message in M3(m) before
round r∗3.
Case (c): Recall that j receives m or a message in M2(m) or in M3(m) before round r in q. Note that
if r∗3 = r, then no player receivesm or any message inM2(m) or inM3(m) before round r in q. Thus,
r∗3 < r must hold. This means that a player receives a message m′ = (κ′, γ′,m, σ′, σ′′) ∈ M3(m)
in round r∗3. If a player receives m′ in round r∗3, then a player must send m′ in round r∗3. According
to the logical formulae with which we tagged the messages in M3, A can send m′ in round r∗3 only if
she receives (γ′,m, σ′) ∈M2(m) or a message in M3(m) that contains (γ′,m, σ′) in an earlier round
rˆ < r∗3 ≤ r∗2. Furthermore, B can send m′ in round r∗3 only if she receives m′ ∈M3(m) in an earlier
round r˜ < r∗3. However, because of the definitions of r∗2, and r∗3, no player can receive a message in
M2(m) before round r∗2, and a message in M3(m) before round r∗3. 2
Lemma 5
The lemma states that no player can ever receive a messagem = (γ, µ, σ) ∈M2 such that γ 6= itemB .
Proof: Let us suppose that there exist a player i ∈ P ′, a round number r ∈ N, and an action sequence
q ∈ Q such that (rcv(m), r) ∈ Hi(q). This means that a player j sends m in round r in q. According
to the logical formulae with which we tagged the messages in M2, this is possible only if j receives a
message in M2 or in M3 that contains γ before round r – no matter whether j is A or B.
Let M2(γ) = {(γ′, µ′, σ′) ∈ M2 : γ′ = γ} and M3(γ) = {(κ′, γ′, µ′, σ′, σ′′) ∈ M3 : γ′ = γ}.
If no player receives any message in M2(γ) before round r in q, then let r∗2 = r, otherwise let r∗2 be
the earliest round in q in which a message in M2(γ) is received by any of the players. If no player
receives any message in M3(γ) before round r in q, then let r∗3 = r, otherwise let r∗3 be the earliest
round in q in which a message in M3(γ) is received by any of the players.
Now, we can distinguish two cases: (a) r∗2 ≤ r∗3, and (b) r∗3 < r∗2.
Case (a): Recall that j receives a message in M2(γ) or in M3(γ) before round r in q. Note that if
r∗2 = r, then no player receives any message in M2(γ) or in M3(γ) before round r in q. Thus, r∗2 < r
must hold. This means that a player receives a message m′ = (γ, µ′, σ′) ∈ M2(γ) in round r∗2. If
a player receives m′ in round r∗2, then a player must send m′ in round r∗2. According to the logical
formulae with which we tagged the messages in M2, A can send m′ in round r∗2 only if she receives
m′ ∈ M2(γ) or a message in M3(γ) that contains m′ in an earlier round rˆ < r∗2 ≤ r∗3. Furthermore,
B can send m′ in round r∗2 only if it receives a message in M2(γ) or in M3(γ) in an earlier round
r˜ < r∗2 ≤ r∗3. However, because of the definitions of r∗2 and r∗3, no player can receive a message in
M2(γ) before round r∗2, and a message in M3(γ) before round r∗3.
Case (b): Note that r∗3 < r must hold (since otherwise r∗2 would be greater than r, which is not
possible by definition). This means that a player receives a message m′ = (κ′, γ, µ′, σ′, σ′′) ∈M3(γ)
in round r∗3. If a player receives m′ in round r∗3, then a player must send m′ in round r∗3. According
to the logical formulae with which we tagged the messages in M3, A can send m′ in round r∗3 only if
she receives (γ, µ′, σ′) ∈ M2(γ) or a message in M3(γ) that contains (γ, µ′, σ′) in an earlier round
rˆ < r∗3 < r∗2. Furthermore, B can send m′ in round r∗3 only if she receives m′ ∈ M3(γ) in an earlier
round r˜ < r∗3. However, because of the definitions of r∗2 and r∗3, no player can receive a message in
M2(γ) before round r∗2, and a message in M3(γ) before round r∗3. 2
Lemma 6
The lemma states that the Syverson protocol is closed for gains.
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Proof: It is enough to prove that for every terminal action sequence q in Gpi|s¯, (i) φ+A(q) implies φ−B(q)
and (ii) for every r, φ+B(q, r) implies φ∗A(q). Both (i) and (ii) follow from the fact that there are only
two players A and B who send messages, which means that if player i ∈ {A,B} receives a message
m, then the other player j ∈ {A,B}, j 6= i must send m. 2
Lemma 7
The lemma states that the Syverson protocol satisfies the safe back out property.
Proof: If A does not send any messages in an action sequence q, then φ∗A(q) = false and φ∗∗A (q) =
false, and thus y−A(q) = 0. If B does not send any messages in an action sequence q, then φ
−
B(q) =
false, and thus y−B(q) = 0. 2
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